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The anxiety-perceptual-motor performance relationship may be enriched by 
investigations involving discrete manual responses due to the definitive demarcation of planning 
and control processes, which comprise the early and late portions of movement, respectively. 
To further examine the explanatory power of self-focus and distraction theories, we explored 
the potential of anxiety causing changes to movement planning that accommodate for 
anticipated negative effects in online control. As a result, we posed two hypotheses where 
anxiety causes performers to initially undershoot the target and enable more time to use visual 
feedback (‘play-it-safe’), or fire a ballistic reach to cover a greater distance without later 
undertaking online control (‘go-for-it’). Participants were tasked with an upper-limb movement to 
a single target under counter-balanced instructions to execute fast and accurate responses 
(low/normal anxiety) with non-contingent negative performance feedback (high anxiety). The 
results indicated that the previously identified negative impact of anxiety in online control was 
replicated. While anxiety caused a longer displacement to reach peak velocity and greater 
tendency to undershoot the target for the high compared to low anxiety, there appeared to be 
no shift in the attempts to utilise online visual feedback. Thus, the tendency to initially overshoot 
may manifest from an inefficient auxiliary procedure that manages to uphold overall movement 
time and response accuracy. 
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The effect that state anxiety (i.e., anxiety pertaining to a perceived threat within a 
particular situation) has on the performance of perceptual-motor tasks has attracted 
considerable research interest (see Eysenck & Wilson, 2016; Nieuwenhuys & Oudejans, 2012 
for recent reviews). This interest is not surprising when we consider the large number of 
domains where individuals have to perform accurate movements under high-stress situations 
(e.g., medicine, aviation, military and sport). To date, the research findings have predominantly 
substantiated two select groups of anxiety theories: self-focus and distraction. 
Self-focus theories (conscious processing hypothesis (CPH); Masters, 1992, explicit 
monitoring; Beilock & Carr, 2001) state that anxiety leads to attention being directed toward the 
performers’ own movements, which may revert performance to an early-declarative stage of 
development (see Fitts & Posner, 1967) and/or elicit an internal focus-set that can heavily 
attenuate performance (see Wulf, McNevin & Shea, 2001). Alternatively, distraction theories 
(processing efficiency theory (PET); Eysenck & Calvo, 1992, attentional control theory (ACT); 
Eysenck et al., 2007) suggest anxiety can re-direct attention to irrelevant sources of worry, 
which may then compromise the availability of resources needed for processing task-relevant 
information. In this regard, performance effectiveness may be upheld by utilising auxiliary 
resources (e.g., mental effort), but at the expense of performance efficiency. 
Recently, researchers have tried to understand more about anxiety and its related 
processes by exploring the specific effects it has on the planning and subsequent control of 
action (e.g., Allsop, Lawrence, Gray, & Khan, 2016; Causer, Holmes, Smith, & Williams, 2011; 
Coombes, Higgins, Gamble, Cauraugh, & Janelle, 2009; Lawrence, Khan & Hardy, 2013; Vine, 
Lee, Moore & Wilson, 2013). Most notably, Lawrence et al. (2013) posited an experimental 
design that directly examined distraction and self-focus theories by formulating opposing 
hypothetical outcomes within a single goal-directed movement. Adapted from the notion that 
manual goal-directed movements comprise two components – planning and control 
(Woodworth, 1899; see also Elliott, Helsen, & Chua, 2001); it was reasoned that distraction 
theories would allude to differences between high and low anxiety conditions during the 
planning phase of the movement, while self-focus theories would argue differences during the 
control phase of the movement. These competing sets of hypotheses assume that planning 
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needs attention toward task-relevant information (e.g., target context), while control unfolds 
automatically with limited cognitive involvement. To infer planning and control processes, the 
researchers adopted a measure of spatial variability – dispersion of displacement at select 
kinematic landmarks (peak acceleration, peak velocity, peak deceleration, movement end) 
throughout the entire trajectory (see Figure 1). This measure is adapted from the notion that 
high-velocity long-amplitude movements naturally subtend greater amounts of variability 
compared to low-velocity short-amplitude movements (Schmidt, Zelaznik, Hawkins, Frank, & 
Quinn, 1979; see also Meyer, Abrams, Kornblum, Wright, & Smith, 1988). Therefore, in an 
instance of a sudden decline in variability before the end of the movement, we can infer that an 
intervening control process was implemented and involved the use of online sensory feedback 
(Khan, Lawrence, Fourkas, et al., 2003; see also Khan et al., 2006). At the same time, any 
differences in variability between conditions that are captured during the early portions of the 
trajectory would reflect planning-related alterations, presumably with the aid of terminal 
feedback obtained from the previous trial (Khan, Lawrence, Franks, & Elliott, 2003). The results 
showed that there was greater spatial variability at the end of the movement for the high 
compared to low anxiety condition with no differences in the early portions of the movement. 
Thus, the findings offered strong support for the tenets of self-focus theories. 
However, a follow-up study (Allsop et al., 2016) showed that while there was a similarly 
negative impact of high state anxiety in online control, there was also an impact observed within 
the early planning phase of the movement. Namely, there was lower spatial variability at peak 
acceleration, peak velocity and peak deceleration in the high compared to low anxiety condition. 
In addition, there was greater mental effort expended following the high anxiety condition. 
Hence, these findings seemed to reconcile the view of distraction theorists (e.g. Eysenck & 
Calvo, 1992), as there were changes made in the planning of the movement, while performance 
efficiency was compromised. As a result, the authors proposed that self-evoked auxiliary 
resources might have enabled some accommodation within pre-movement planning because of 
an anticipated deleterious effect of anxiety during late online control. 
This conjecture is heavily adapted from recent developments to the two-component 
model of manual goal-directed movements (Elliott et al., 2010; Elliott et al., 2017). That is, while 
there are two dichotomous components, the anticipation of online sensory feedback can greatly 
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inform the planning process so much so that online control is contingent upon the pre-planned 
use of sensory information. To elucidate, prior knowledge of visual feedback for goal-directed 
movements typically elicits a larger magnitude force and shorter proportional time at peak 
velocity (i.e., positive skew in the time-course of movement velocity) (Hansen, Glazebrook, 
Anson, Weeks, & Elliott, 2006; Khan, Elliott, Coull, Chua, & Lyons, 2002; see Causer, Hayes, 
Hooper, & Bennett, 2017 for an example of oculomotor control in golf-putting). What’s more, a 
suspected decline in the ability to control can cause an increasingly shorter proportion of time to 
peak velocity (Mottet, van Dokkum, Froger, Gouïach, & Laffont, 2017; Timmis & Pardhan, 2012; 
Welsh, Higgins, & Elliott, 2007). That is, a further and faster reach within the early portions of 
the trajectory is presumably prepared to accommodate the late online control phase. In this 
regard, the forces and timing of goal-directed movements are parameterized with a view to 
utilising online sensory feedback. This view contends that performers must initially comprehend 
the sources of sensory information that they will receive late on in the movement. 
Of interest, the planning of goal-directed movements is also contingent upon the 
potential outcome of movements (i.e., errors) and their implications for overall energy-
expenditure (Elliott, Hansen, Mendoza, & Tremblay, 2004). As a result, the limb will typically fall 
short of the target prior to undertaking late online control because it avoids an overshoot error 
that requires more time and energy to amend (Lyons, Hansen, Hurding, & Elliott, 2006; 
Roberts, Elliott, Burkitt, & Lyons, 2016; cf. Roberts, Blinch et al., 2016). Corrections to an initial 
overshoot require performers to reverse the limb, which contend with the more demanding 
situation of overcoming inertia and alternating agonist and antagonistic muscle functions. 
Hence, it is in the performers’ best interest to ‘play-it-safe’ and initially undershoot the target if 
indeed they are to potentially miss and assume a late correction. Because of this particular 
feature in planning, it stands to reason that in situations of greater uncertainty there will be a 
more conservative means to avoid an undesirable movement outcome – the more uncertain the 
outcome, the greater the undershoot. Indeed, it has been shown that unintended spatial 
variability negatively co-varies with the extent of the primary movement amplitude (Worringham, 
1991; see also Harris & Wolpert, 1998). 
However, a feasible alternative may be offered by Allsop et al. (2016) who indicated 
that performers may contest the negative effects in online control by inversely limiting the need 
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to amend the limb following an initial restriction to the spatial variability. In a similar vein, 
Cassell and colleagues (Cassell, Beattie, & Lawrence, 2017) found that the prolonged 
movement times from practice with anxiety to transfer with no anxiety (control) failed to unfold in 
the reverse context (i.e., no anxiety-practice to anxiety-transfer). Indeed, the absence of a 
negative specificity effect when transferring to a situation of anxiety was suggested to result 
from performers opting for an open-loop approach where extending the time for visually-
regulated online control served no added benefit. Taken together, it may be conceived that the 
performer seeks to ‘go-for-it’ by way of a pre-planned arrangement to limit the variability and 
increase the chances of landing inside the target without the guidance of online visual 
feedback. Therefore, a high-stress situation may be likened to an approach typically adopted in 
open-loop/no vision conditions – trajectory modifications being isolated to the early movement 
phases without concern or accommodation for visually-regulated online corrections. While this 
approach may seem counter-intuitive due to a failure to take advantage of the visual feedback 
that is available, it is still very much a possibility if the performer assumes online control serves 
no further advantage to an already refined initial impulse. 
The aim of the present study was to more closely examine the planning and control of 
goal-directed aiming movements under high and low state anxiety. More specifically, we aim to 
re-examine the indices that are traditionally adopted to indicate planning and control (i.e., 
spatio-temporal dynamics of peak acceleration, peak velocity, peak deceleration and movement 
end). As per previous findings (Allsop et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2013), it is predicted that 
there will be an increase in variability at the end of the movement, which will be partially offset 
by a decrease earlier in the movement (peak acceleration/peak velocity/peak deceleration) for 
the high compared to low anxiety condition. The subsequent analyses therein may be 
leveraged to elucidate the precise source of these pre-planned modifications. Indeed, the 
traditional perspective of optimizing the utilisation of visual feedback and energy-expenditure 
(play-it-safe strategy; Elliott et al., 2004) predicts that there will be a strategic shift in the use of 
online visual feedback as indicated by a shorter proportion of time to reach peak velocity – 
extending the time after peak velocity – for the high compared to low anxiety condition. What’s 
more, the uncertainty surrounding movement outcomes should drive a shorter primary 
movement and/or increase the frequency of undershoots for the high compared to low anxiety 
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condition. Alternatively, the predominantly feedforward control perspective (go-for-it strategy) 
assumes that anxiety will invoke an inverse extension to the proportion of time to peak velocity 
(resembling a more symmetric velocity profile) (Hansen et al., 2006; Khan et al. 2002), increase 
the displacement at the primary movement (Khan, Franks, & Goodman, 1998), and decrease 
the frequency of two-component submovements (Elliott et al., 2014). Finally, the more extreme 
version of this approach may render a trade-off between speed and accuracy, where time-
consuming visual feedback-based corrections may be eradicated at the expense of a larger 
error rate for the high compared to low anxiety condition (see Carlton, 1981; Elliott & Madalena, 
1987; Khan et al., 1998). 
 




Fourteen participants, with an age range of 18-30 years, took part in the study. All 
participants were self-reported right handed, had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no 
neurological and/or anxiety disorders. The study was designed and conducted in accordance 
with the Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the McMaster Research Ethics Board. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
The stimulus was displayed on a 57 cm x 34 cm computer monitor with a temporal 
resolution of 60 Hz and spatial resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels. An in-house designed open-
faced frame was used to secure the monitor (see Roberts, Burkitt et al., 2016). The frame was 
held in-place by an adjustable steel ledge (43.0 cm x 35.5 cm), which was attached to a vertical 
stand (180 cm height). The ledge and affixed frame were oriented horizontally so the monitor 
display was directly facing up, while the height was adjusted to the hip joint of the participant. 
An infra-red marker was attached to the tip of the right index finger and detected via an 
Optotrak 3020 (Northern Digital Instruments, Waterloo, ON) collecting at 200 Hz for a period of 
2 s. A custom-written program in E-prime (Psychology Software Tools Inc., Sharpsburg, PA) 
was used to control the stimulus and trigger the Optotrak via a parallel port connection. 
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State anxiety was measured using the Mental Readiness Form-3 (MRF-3) (Krane, 
1994), which features three bipolar 11-point subscales that indicate cognitive anxiety (not 
worried-worried), somatic anxiety (not tense-tense) and self-confidence (confident-not 
confident). In a similar vein to previous studies (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2013; Wilson, 
Chattington, Marple-Horvat, & Smith, 2007), we focused on the cognitive anxiety subscale. 
 
Task and Procedure 
Participants were instructed to aim their right index finger toward a circular target as fast 
and accurately as possible. The target and movement parameters were adapted from Lawrence 
et al. (2013). That is, the home position and target object were 1 cm in diameter and separated 
by 24 cm (centre-to-centre). Both the home position and target object were coloured black and 
appeared on a white background. Individual trials proceeded with the appearance of the home 
position near the midline of the participant. Following a random foreperiod (800-2800 ms; 500 
ms intervals), the target would appear along the midline and cued the participant to move. Each 
participant was provided a familiarisation period of 30 trials involving the execution of 
movements as fast and accurate as possible. The participant then completed a total of 60 
experimental trials, which were separated into two blocks of 30 trials. Prior to each block, the 
participant was provided an instructional set that was specifically designed to manipulate state 
anxiety. 
For the high anxiety condition, the experimenter instructed the participant to take a 
break while their data was being assessed. This pretence featured the experimenter visibly 
transferring the electronic movement trial files from the Optotrak computer to a separate lab 
computer. The experimenter would then look at the computer and pretend to perform a series of 
functions in order to assess the data. After a three-minute delay, the experimenter would turn to 
the participant and inform them that an index of their performance, which computationally 
combines their speed and accuracy, was calculated and revealed that their performance 
entered into the lower 30th percentile out of all the participants previously collected. In addition, 
the participant was instructed that if they were to move up in the rankings then they would have 
to execute faster and more accurate responses. This anxiety manipulation follows a similar 
procedure to previous studies that have raised ego-threat through the provision of non-
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contingent performance feedback (e.g., Wilson, Vine, & Wood, 2009). For the low anxiety 
condition, the experimenter simply instructed the participant to keep executing fast and 
accurate responses. While false performance feedback may not be ideal because of the 
potential to contaminate movement performance independent of felt stress (Cassell et al., 
2017), it is important to realise that the instructions equally emphasised the importance of both 
accuracy and speed – failure in either or both would cause a poorer performance evaluation. As 
a result, the instructions were unlikely to cause a trade-off between speed and accuracy, and 
thus rendered the same performance objectives as the low anxiety/control condition  
Because familiarisation/practice at a goal-directed aiming task can strongly mediate the 
planning and control of actions (Elliott et al., 2004), both sets of instructions were received in a 
counter-balanced order. Therefore, in the event the high condition was received first then the 
participant was led to believe that the performance evaluation and non-contingent feedback 
was based solely on the initial practice trials (i.e., first 30 trials). However, if the high condition 
was received last then the participant was led to believe that the performance evaluation and 
non-contingent feedback was based on the practice and low anxiety trials (i.e., total of 60 trials). 
In the event the low condition was received first then the participant was led to believe that they 
were continuing to move as fast and accurately as possible without their performance being 
assessed. If the low condition was received last then the participant was led to believe that the 
upcoming trials made up the penultimate block where performance was not being assessed. 
Finally, each participant completed the MRF-3 prior to and mid-way between each individual 
block of experimental movement trials. 
 
Data Reduction and Dependent Measures 
Position data were filtered using a second-order, dual-pass Butterworth filter with a 
10Hz low-pass cut-off frequency. Data were differentiated and double-differentiated to obtain 
velocity and acceleration, respectively. Movement onset and offset were defined as the first 
frame where the velocity reached respectively above and below 10mm/s in the primary axis of 
the movement (z-axis) for a period of at least 40ms (8 frames). The primary axis was selected 
because it more appropriately reflects the empirical works of movement optimization (e.g., 
Elliott et al., 2004; Lyons et al., 2006) for which our hypotheses have been heavily adapted. 
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Secondly, the nature of the task encompasses the planning and control of the movement 
amplitude, which isolates potential influences to the primary direction (Khan & Binsted, 2010; 
see also Gordon, Ghilardi, & Ghez, 1994), including the motion and position of the limb (Elliott 
et al., 2010). 
Performance outcomes: We initially assessed coarse indicators of performance using 
the outcome variables of reaction time, movement time, proportion of target errors (categorised 
by absolute endpoint location relative to target-centre (% of total trials); < -5 mm or > 5 mm), 
constant error (signed error differences between the participant movement end and the target 
location with negative scores indicating an undershoot) and variable error (population standard 
deviation of the signed error differences).  
Movement kinematics: Using a custom-written program in MATLAB (The Mathworks, 
Inc.), we identified the moment of peak acceleration, peak velocity and peak deceleration within 
each of the movement trials and calculated their time, displacement and magnitude. Because 
the prior knowledge of sensory feedback for upcoming trials can lead to a strategic shift in the 
proportional time dedicated to online control (see Hansen et al., 2006), we also calculated the 
proportion of time to peak velocity. Additionally, based on the notion that reverses in variability 
following increasing amplitude indicate an intervening control process (Khan et al., 2006), and 
in keeping with previous studies (Allsop et al., 2016; Lawrence et al., 2013), we assessed the 
within-participant standard deviation of the displacement for each of the kinematic landmarks.  
Component submovements: Trials featuring two-component submovements were 
identified by marking the end of the primary submovement, which could be indicated by a 
positive-to-negative zero-line crossing in velocity (synonymous with a movement reversal), a 
negative-to-positive zero-line crossing in acceleration (synonymous with a re-acceleration) 
and/or deviation in the acceleration trace following peak velocity (synonymous with 
discontinuities or ‘braking’) (see Khan et al., 2006 for more detail). Thereafter, the mean and 
within-participant standard deviation of the primary movement endpoint was calculated, as well 
as the frequency of primary movement outcomes with respect to the target. More precisely, 
primary movements were categorised by whether they landed under (< -5 mm), on (> -5 mm 




In order to check our manipulation and ensure that the high anxiety condition generated 
greater cognitive state anxiety than the low anxiety condition, we first compared the mean MRF-
3 scores between the high and low anxiety conditions. Because Likert scale data assume an 
ordinal level scale, the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test (one-tailed) was adopted for 
this particular comparison (see Jamieson, 2004 and Roberts, Bennett, Elliott, & Hayes, 2016). 
For the analysis of performance outcomes and mean movement kinematics (peak 
acceleration, peak velocity, peak deceleration, movement end), we used paired-samples 
dependent t-tests to compare the high and low anxiety conditions. Because spatial variability 
assumes a progressive increase across movement amplitude prior to a control-based 
intervention, we analysed this by using a 2 Anxiety (high, low) x 4 Kinematic landmark (PA, PV, 
PD, END) repeated-measures ANOVA. For the analysis of component submovements, we 
again used paired-samples t-tests for the mean displacement and spatial variability at the 
primary movement. The outcome of primary movements were analysed using a 2 Anxiety (high, 
low) x 3 Outcome (under, on, over) repeated-measures ANOVA. For each of the omnibus 
ANOVAs, we corrected any violations in the Sphericity-assumption (as indicated by Mauchly’s 
test of Sphericity; p < .05) by using the Huynh-Feldt correction when ɛ was greater than or 
equal to .75, or the Greenhouse-Geisser correction if otherwise (original Sphericity-assumed 
degrees of freedom were reported). Significant main or interaction effects featuring more than 
two means were decomposed using the Tukey HSD post hoc procedure. For all statistical 
analyses, significance was declared at p < .05. 
 
Results 
Eleven of the fourteen participants were forwarded to the analysis having successfully 
reported believing the non-contingent feedback and the related instruction of a decline in speed 
and accuracy. The initial manipulation check confirmed that the high anxiety condition 
generated significantly greater cognitive state anxiety than the low anxiety condition (T = 1.5, z 
= -1.90, p < .05) (see Table 1). 
Any trials that were performed with a reaction time <100 ms or >1000 ms were deemed 
to be anticipatory and non-reactive responses, respectively. Movement times that exceeded 
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800 ms were considered not to be rapid goal-directed responses (e.g., Lawrence, Khan, 
Mottram, Adam, & Buckolz, 2016). On each of these occasions then the entire trial was 
removed before data analysis. 
 
Performance Outcomes 
Table 1 shows the mean performance outcomes. Indeed, there were no significant 
differences between the high and low anxiety condition for proportion of target errors (t(10) = 
1.56, p > .05, d = .47), and constant error (t(10) = 1.11, p > .05, d = .33). The differences 
between the high and low anxiety conditions failed to reach conventional levels of significance 
for reaction time (t(10) = 1.91, p = .085, d = .58), and movement time (t(10) = 2.08, p = .064, d 
=.63), although tended to indicate that high anxiety trials were initiated earlier and executed 
faster than low anxiety trials. Meanwhile, there was a significant difference in variable error 
(t(10) = 3.16, p < .05, d = .95) with a larger dispersion subtended by the high compared to low 
anxiety condition. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Movement Kinematics 
Table 2 shows the mean kinematic variables. For the time to kinematic landmarks, 
there were no significant differences at peak acceleration (t(10) = .80, p > .05, d = .24) and 
peak velocity (t(10) = .55, p > .05, d = .17). There was a significant difference for the time to 
peak deceleration (t(10) = 2.27, p < .05, d = .68) with a shorter time for the high compared to 
the low anxiety condition. There were no significant differences in the proportion of time to peak 
velocity (t(10) = 1.68, p > .05, d = .51). 
The displacement at kinematic landmarks revealed no significant difference at peak 
acceleration (t(10) = 1.28, p > .05, d = .39), peak deceleration (t(10) = .17, p > .05, d = .05), and 
the end of the movement (t(10) = 1.58, p > .05, d = .48). There was a significant difference for 
the displacement at peak velocity (t(10) = 2.72, p < .05, d = .82) indicating a longer 
displacement for the high compared to the low anxiety condition. Meanwhile, the magnitude of 
kinematic landmarks revealed no significant difference at peak acceleration (t(10) = .99, p > .05, 
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d = .30), while the differences at peak velocity (t(10) = 2.16, p = .056, d = .65) and peak 
deceleration (t(10) = 2.04, p = .069, d = .62), neared conventional levels of significance, with a 
greater magnitude following the high compared to the low anxiety condition. 
The spatial variability analysis revealed no significant main effect of anxiety (F(1, 10) = 
2.25, p > .05, partial ƞ2 = .18), although there was a significant main effect of kinematic 
landmark (F(3, 30) = 32.68, p < .05, partial ƞ2 = .77) indicating a progressive increase from peak 
acceleration to peak deceleration prior to a decrease at movement end. Of even greater 
interest, there was a significant Anxiety x Kinematic landmark interaction (F(3, 30) = 3.00, p < 
.05, partial ƞ2 = .23) (see Figure 2). Post hoc analyses revealed that while there were no 
significant differences at peak acceleration, peak velocity and movement end (ps > .05), there 
was significantly lower spatial variability at peak deceleration for the high compared to the low 
anxiety condition (p < .05). 
 
[Insert Table 2 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
Component submovements 
Table 3 indicates measures at the primary movement endpoint. There was no 
significant difference between the high and low anxiety conditions for the proportion of two-
component submovements (i.e., consisting of both primary and secondary submovements) 
(t(10) = .16, p > .05, d = .05). There were no significant differences for the mean displacement 
(t(10) = .99, p > .05, d = .30), nor spatial variability (t(10) = .05, p > .05, d = .02) of the primary 
movement. 
There was no significant main effect of anxiety (F(1, 10) = 1.00, p > .05, partial ƞ2 = 
.09), although there was a significant main effect of outcome (F(2, 20) = 28.98, p < .05, partial 
ƞ2 = .74) indicating a larger number of target hits compared to undershoots and overshoots, 
which failed to differ from each other. This effect was superseded by a significant Anxiety x 
Outcome interaction (F(2, 20) = 3.57, p < .05, partial ƞ2 = .26). Post hoc analyses revealed that 
there were no significant differences between anxiety conditions for the number of undershoots 
and target hits (ps > .05), although there was a greater number of overshoots for the high 
compared to the low anxiety condition (p < .05). 
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In order to assess the implications of primary movement outcomes on performance, we 
examined the mean movement times following select categories of primary movement 
outcomes. That is, we compared the movement times following primary movement 
undershoots, direct hits and overshoots (see Elliott et al., 2004).1 There was no significant main 
effect of anxiety (F(1, 9) = 2.42, p > .05, partial ƞ2 = .16), although there was a significant main 
effect of outcome (F(2, 18) = 8.59, p < .05, partial ƞ2 = .49) indicating a longer time for 
overshoots (M = 481.72 ms, SE = 4.89) compared to target hits (M = 436.17 ms, SE = 5.21) 
with an intermediate time for undershoots (M = 469.36 ms, SE = 5.92). There was no significant 
Anxiety x Outcome interaction (F(2, 18) = 1.45, p > .05, partial ƞ2 = .26). 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Supplementary analyses – Online control 
Because the magnitude of differences in variable error may be considered meagre 
(mean difference = .48), we sought further clarification of the deleterious effect of anxiety within 
online control. Based on the notion that accurate endpoint responses require a compensation of 
the distances travelled to kinematic landmarks by adjusting the distances travelled after them, it 
is reasonable to assume that there will be a stronger negative relation between the 
displacements to and after kinematic landmarks in the event of a more proficient online control 
process (Elliott, Binsted, & Heath, 1999; Khan, Sarteep, Mottram, Lawrence, & Adam, 2011; 
Roberts, Elliott, Lyons, Hayes, & Bennett, 2016). Therefore, we calculated within-participant 
correlations between the displacements to and after kinematic landmarks followed by a Fisher 
z-transformation. A paired-samples t-test revealed that a significantly smaller negative relation 
at peak deceleration began to emerge for the high (M = -2.14, SE = .14) compared to low (M = -
2.42, SE = .11) anxiety condition (t(10) = 3.29, p < .05, d = .97). Thus, there was confirmation of 
a negative impact of anxiety during online control. 
 
Summary 
The results summarised herein will be referred to in the context of the effect served by 
high state anxiety as opposed to low/normal state anxiety: There was an increase in variable 
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error at the end of the movement, which was corroborated by a smaller relation between the 
distances travelled to and after peak deceleration. These effects within online control were 
preceded by an extended displacement at peak velocity, and reduced time and spatial 
variability at peak deceleration. At the same time, there was no strategic shift in the proportion 
of time to reach peak velocity, which indicates a limited change in the time designated to offline 
planning and online control. Finally, there appeared no evidence of a shortening of the 
amplitude displacement of primary movement endpoints. Instead, there was a marginally 
greater proportion of primary movements that overshot the target location. 
 
Discussion 
Previous research has suggested that our understanding of the anxiety-perceptual-
motor performance relationship can be greatly informed by the type of goal-directed aiming 
paradigm used in the current study (e.g., Lawrence et al., 2013). Indeed, this paradigm provides 
the opportunity to demarcate both the planning and control phases and elucidates the precise 
sensorimotor processes underlying the effect of anxiety. That is, the early planning phase 
comprises features that require attention to task-relevant information that could become 
compromised when anxious (distraction hypothesis). Alternatively, the late control phase, which 
typically features limited cognitive involvement, may become cognitively decomposed or 
explicitly attended to when anxious (self-focus hypothesis). 
Previously, it was suggested that the potential negative influence of anxiety within 
online control (Lawrence et al., 2013) might be compensated within pre-movement planning 
(Allsop et al., 2016). Thus, the present study predicted that high anxiety will inflict increases in 
endpoint variability, which would be partially offset by a decrease during the earlier portions of 
the movement (peak acceleration/peak velocity/peak deceleration). In keeping with the view of 
movement optimization or the play-it-safe strategy (Elliott et al., 2004; Elliott et al., 2010), the 
anticipation of upcoming sensory information assumes that an attenuation in control caused by 
high anxiety should subsequently extend the time spent after peak velocity (shorter proportion 
of time to peak velocity) (Hansen et al., 2006; Khan et al., 2002; Welsh et al., 2007). In addition, 
the growing uncertainty surrounding potential movement outcomes following high anxiety 
should generate a more profound tendency to undershoot the target in order to avoid time- and 
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energy-consuming corrections (Elliott et al., 2004). Alternatively, the pure feedforward or go-for-
it strategy (Allsop et al., 2016), where planning-related modifications fail to incorporate the 
possibility of utilising online visual feedback, assumes a similar pattern of results as a standard 
no vision condition. That is, there should be a longer proportion of time to peak velocity, 
extended displacement at the primary movement, reduced propensity for two-component 
submovements, and possibly more errors for the high compared to low anxiety condition. 
In agreement with our first hypothesis, there was an increase in variability toward the 
end of the movement (see VE effects) combined with decreases at peak deceleration for the 
high compared to low anxiety condition.2 These findings partially replicate those of Allsop et al. 
(2016), and thus correspond with suggestions of accommodation within the planning phase. 
That is, the anticipation of a limited control process means performers must attempt to 
compensate by restricting the amount of variability accumulated within the earlier portions of the 
movement. Consistent with this conjecture was evidence of a longer displacement at peak 
velocity, and shorter onset and more abrupt peak deceleration for the high compared to low 
anxiety condition. 
The accommodation demonstrated in planning following high anxiety failed to extend to 
differences in the proportion of time to peak velocity. Indeed, a measure of the relative time-
course of velocity can allude to the amount of online control within a single goal-directed 
movement (e.g., Chua & Elliott, 1993; Elliott, Pollock, Lyons, & Chua, 1995). The typical 
response in the presence of visual feedback combined with the knowledge of a deleterious 
effect in online control is to distribute more time after peak velocity. In contrast, the much riskier 
measure (i.e., more likely to incur a speed-accuracy trade-off) of the performer eradicating the 
temporal delay of visually-regulated online control should manifest in an extended proportion of 
time to peak velocity. However, the limited differences found in the present study may suggest 
that despite the attenuation to online control following high state anxiety, there were no strategic 
adjustments in the time dedicated to sensory feedback processing. We suspect the failure to 
strategically shift the time dedicated to online control may be because participants were trying 
to uphold short overall performance or movement times (visual feedback delay >100 ms; 
Carlton, 1992), while still ensuring a relatively precise endpoint target response. 
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In a similar vein, there were limited differences in the displacement of the primary 
movements. This finding may be somewhat surprising given the differences in endpoint 
variability and the fact standard goal-directed responses involve an inverse relation between the 
primary movement endpoints and the degree of uncertainty surrounding initial movement 
outcomes (Lyons et al., 2006; Worringham, 1991). Instead, there appeared to be an overall 
tendency for participants to overshoot the target for the high compared to low anxiety condition. 
At first glance, this finding appears to support the riskier go-for-it strategy as performers could 
have tried to cope with the deleterious effect of anxiety in online control by simply eradicating it, 
and generating a longer displacement in the initial primary movement (Allsop et al., 2016). 
However, considering the fact that there was no systematic shift in the proportional time to peak 
velocity, and no alterations in the propensity to undertake two-component submovements, nor 
commit target errors, suggests such an interpretation may be premature. This argument is 
corroborated by the fact that the high and low anxiety conditions equally incurred a robust 
positive skew in the proportion of time to peak velocity (~30% of the total time) and 
predominantly featured two-component submovements (~80% of trials) meaning visually-
regulated online control was most likely undertaken. Instead, it is possible that the tendency to 
overshoot the primary movements under high state anxiety, while sustaining attempts to 
process online visual feedback, alludes to a failure in implementing an energy-efficient 
approach that continues to uphold overall performance. This conjecture clearly corresponds 
with the central tenets of distraction theories (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007), 
which state that anxiety has a greater influence on performance efficiency than performance 
effectiveness.   
In reviewing the evidence in online control, there was at least some indication of a 
deleterious effect of anxiety courtesy of an enhanced endpoint variability and reduced relation 
between the displacements to and after peak deceleration. Notably, however, the predicted 
decline in online control in the present study, along with the endpoint variability findings from 
Allsop et al. (2016), were markedly smaller than that reported by Lawrence et al. (2013). In 
reconciling these seemingly disparate findings, we may consider the spatial variability exhibited 
earlier within the movement, as only the present study and Allsop et al. (2016) found a 
reduction in the early kinematic landmarks for high compared to low anxiety. Thus, it is likely 
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that the between-study differences in the magnitude of effects in online control resulted from the 
earlier impact on spatial variability that may (e.g., Allsop et al., 2016), or may not (e.g., 
Lawrence et al., 2013), have manifested following high state anxiety. That is, the fewer 
measures that are taken in the early portions of the movement, which are designed to nullify the 
deleterious effects in online control, then the greater the endpoint variability. In this regard, we 
may alternatively question how it is that anxiety differentially affected the early portions of goal-
directed movements across each of the fore mentioned studies. It is possible that these 
differences can be explained by the variations in the order or scheduling of the high and low 
anxiety conditions, which may inadvertently affect the organisation of initial primary movements 
(Elliott et al., 2004) and sensory feedback processing (Khan et a., 1998; Proteau, Martenuik, 
Girouard, & Dugas, 1987). Although these suggestions are adapted from robust empirical 
findings, they remain highly speculative and require further investigation. 
The general finding of a negative impact of anxiety during online control has been 
strongly attributed to the disruption of automaticity via explicit monitoring or reinvestment in the 
conscious control of movement (Lawrence et al., 2013). As a result, previous findings have 
greatly substantiated the predictions of self-focus theories (Baumeister, 1984; Beilock & Carr, 
2001; Masters, 1992). Indeed, this interpretation is based on the assumption that late online 
control typically recruits implicit processes that operate outside of conscious control. However, it 
remains elusive whether such slowed control processes comprise unconscious awareness (see 
Cressman, Franks, Enns, & Chua, 2006; 2007). After all, late online control can be heavily 
influenced by the pre-planned anticipation of upcoming sensory feedback (Hansen et al., 2006; 
Khan et al., 2002; Timmis & Pardhan, 2012; Zelaznik, Hawkins, & Kisselburgh, 1983). Thus, it 
may be possible to explain the previous findings of anxiety-related effects in the context of 
distraction theories (Calvo & Eysenck, 1992; Eysenck et al., 2007; Eysenck & Wilson, 2016). 
That is, the deleterious effect of anxiety within online control may manifest from a reallocation of 
attentional resources to the planning phase of the movement. Indeed, the introduction of a high-
pressure or -stress situation may cause worry (e.g., failure to reach performance standards), 
which in turn leads the performer to allocate their attention to the precise sources of this worry 
(e.g., motor plan). As a result, there are fewer resources in working memory to deal with the 
relevant sources of information (e.g., online sensory feedback). Because of this limited 
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resource, the performer may draw upon auxiliary resources (e.g., self-control strength; see 
Allsop et al., 2016; Englert & Bertram, 2012; Englert & Bertram, 2015) in order to maintain 
performance standards. Future research may wish to examine these suggestions by 
incorporating appropriate measures of mental effort (e.g., Rating Scale of Mental Effort (Zijlstra, 
1993)) (e.g., Cassell et al., 2017; Lawrence et al., 2013; Wilson et al., 2009), as well as 
independently manipulating planning (e.g., initial target context) and control (e.g., movement 
perturbations) to observe how anxiety affects our ability to deal with these types of extreme 
situations. 
In summary, the current findings lend partial support to the framework proposed by 
Allsop et al. (2016). That is, some accommodation within movement planning coincided with a 
deleterious effect in online control following high state anxiety. These planning-related 
modifications were evidenced by a reduced spatial variability and earlier onset deceleration. 
Despite the failings in online control, the changes witnessed in the planning phase did not 
extend to a profuse attempt to ‘play-it-safe’ or ‘go-for-it’, where performers would either 
decrease or increase both the displacement of the primary movement and proportion of time to 
peak velocity, respectively. Despite the more regular tendency to overshoot the primary 
movement under high state anxiety, there were no changes in the time dedicated to 
planning/control, nor the number of trials featuring two-component submovements and endpoint 
errors. Thus, the deleterious effects in online control may have been solely compensated by 
drawing a consistent spatial location at peak deceleration while still trying to undertake visually-
regulated online control. In the end, overall performance (error, MT) could be successfully 
upheld, although with limited regard to energy-expenditure (Eysenck et al., 2007). With this in 
mind, there is a great need to further examine our interpretations, and thus, more closely 
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Tables 
Table 1. Median (IQR) scores from the cognitive sub-scale of the MRF-3, and mean (± SE) of 
the performance outcome measures as a function of anxiety (units indicated in brackets under 
dependent measures column; (**) indicates a significant difference (p < .05)). 
Performance Outcomes High Low 
MRF-3 (cognitive) ** 3.00 (4.50) 1.50 (2.80) 
Error rate (%) 19.22 (1.33) 12.25 (0.63) 
Constant error (mm) .09 (.16) -0.53 (.06) 
Variable error (mm) ** 3.33 (.09) 2.90 (.07) 
Reaction time (ms) 347.89 (2.74) 363.57 (4.13) 
Movement time (ms) 443.82 (4.92) 466.75 (4.76) 
 
Table 2. Mean (± SE) of movement kinematics as a function of anxiety (peak acceleration (PA), 
peak velocity (PV), peak deceleration (PD), movement end (END)) (units indicated in brackets 
under dependent measures column; (**) indicates a significant difference (p < .05)). 
Movement kinematics High Low 
Time to PA (ms) 44.62 (.64) 43.98 (.56) 
Time to PV (ms) 128.75 (.02) 130.08 (2.32) 
Time to PD (ms) ** 232.04 (4.69) 245.58 (5.02) 
Proportion of time to PV (%) 29.71 (.44) 28.39 (.40) 
Displacement at PA (mm) 10.53 (.33) 10.53 (.34) 
Displacement at PV (mm) ** 103.42 (.87) 98.59 (1.02) 
Displacement at PD (mm) 212.75 (1.22) 212.25 (.83) 
Displacement at END (mm) 239.69 (.13) 239.18 (.14) 
Magnitude of PA (m/s2) 20.51 (.69) 19.73 (.65) 
Magnitude of PV (m/s) 1.43 (.03) 1.34 (.03) 
Magnitude of PD (m/s2) 12.61 (.44) 11.20 (.46) 
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Table 3. Mean (± SE) of the component submovement measures as a function of anxiety (units 
indicated in brackets under dependent measures column; (**) indicates a significant difference 
(p < .05)). 
Primary movement High Low 
Two components (%) 80.86 (1.63) 81.93 (1.59) 
Displacement (mm) 240.25 (.21) 239.48 (.23) 
Undershoot (%) 14.03 (.70) 18.39 (.84) 
On (%) 59.97 (1.38) 63.90 (1.25) 




Fig. 1 Representative velocity-acceleration profile of a discrete goal-directed aim. The primary 
(left) and secondary (right) vertical axes indicate the magnitude of velocity and acceleration, 
respectively. The black dotted line and grey solid line indicate the velocity and acceleration 
respectively across time (horizontal axis). The solid circles represent key kinematic landmarks: 
peak acceleration, peak velocity and peak deceleration in ascending order of time. The cross-
hair represents the end of a primary submovement and beginning of a secondary submovement 
(marked by discontinuities in acceleration for this particular example). 
 
Fig. 2 Mean spatial variability (± SE) (mm) as a function of anxiety and kinematic landmark 




1. One participant was removed from the analysis of movement times that were categorized 
by primary movement outcomes (i.e., undershoot, target hit, overshoot) because they 
failed to register a single overshoot in at least one of the anxiety conditions. 
2. The failure to generate consistent statistical outcomes for VE and spatial variability at the 
movement endpoint was perhaps due to a number of reasons: both dependent measures 
were analysed using different statistical models (VE using a standard t-test; spatial 
variability using Tukey HSD post hoc following an initial omnibus ANOVA), there were 
subtle variations in the denominator comprising their calculus (VE had no restriction to the 
degrees of freedom (synonymous with population standard deviation; Schmidt & Lee, 
1999); spatial variability was not free to vary (synonymous with sample standard 
deviation)), and the numerator consisting of the limb’s endpoint position was also 
calculated differently (error scores deriving VE were taken with respect to the absolute end 
limb position; variability of the movement endpoint was calculated relative to the start of the 
movement, which may have slightly varied across trials). 
